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30 European Central Bank Working Paper SeriesThe purpose of this paper is to analyze how shocks propagate through a network of ﬁrms
that borrow from, and lend to, each other in a trade credit chain, and to quantify the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial contagion across ﬁrms. I develop a theoretical model of ﬁnancial contagion, in
which the default of one ﬁrm may cause a chain reaction such that its creditors also get into
ﬁnancial diﬃculties, even though they are sound in the ﬁrst place. I calibrate and simulate
the model using US annual data over the period 1986-2004. At the microeconomic level,
I ﬁnd that, when customers of a sound ﬁrm are ﬁnancially distressed, then this ﬁrm gets
into ﬁnancial diﬃculties with probability that ranges from 4.1% to 12.8% (depending on the
business cycle and the underlying economic scenario). Looking at the macroeconomic level, I
ﬁnd that defaults on trade debts lower aggregate GDP by at least 0.4%. During the second
half of the 90’s, these deadweight losses doubled and reached a high of 0.9% to 2.3% of GDP
(depending on the underlying economic scenario) before the recession of 2001. The results of
the simulations also suggest that ﬁnancial contagion across businesses had been 25% higher
during the last recession than during the recession of the early 90’s.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, G29,G33
Key words: Financial contagion, trade credit, business ﬂuctuations
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss and quantify the impact of the use of trade credit on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial
distress at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels. Trade credit is the single most important source of external ﬁnance
for ﬁrms. It appears on every balance sheet and represented more than one half of US businesses’ short term
liabilities in 2004.1 It is also is a very peculiar source of ﬁnance. First, ﬁrms simultaneously grant and receive
trade credits, which therefore appear on both sides of their balance sheet. Second, trade credit is in general
not well diversiﬁed at the ﬁrm level, as ﬁrms’ customers tend to belong to a speciﬁc sector. It is indeed not
rare for a company to have one large trade credit vis-a-vis one main client on its books, which may represent
t h ee n t i r ep r o ﬁto ft h ey e a r .
These two features led some authors, like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), to argue that the use of trade credit
causes shocks to propagate in the economy. For instance, if the main client of a company has no money, then
this company might not get paid prior to the end of the year, meaning that it will have no proﬁtf o rt h ey e a r .
In the worst case, the company will default on its debts as well; in the best case, its credit rating will be
downgraded, making it more expensive to raise external funds and to invest. In Kiyotaki and Moore’s words,
"a small, negative, speciﬁcs h o c kt oo n eﬁrm’s technology or net worth may cause a chain reaction in which
other ﬁrms get into ﬁnancial diﬃculties". The recent crisis in the Airline sector provides typical examples of
such chain reactions. In September 2004, for instance, the "exposure of Electronic Data Systems (EDS) to US
Airways was such that it could slice almost a third from its third-quarter earnings as it [EDS] joined the list
of creditors and suppliers to suﬀer following the airline’s bankruptcy ﬁling" (Financial Times, 17/09/04).2
Non-payments of trade credit do not aﬀect only large companies. Collecting the answers from 131 US small
businesses that ﬁled for bankruptcy to a questionnaire about the causes for their failures in 2002, Bradley and
Rubach (2002) indeed ﬁnd that entrepreneurs consider non-payments of trade credit as the most important
cause for their bankruptcy (31% of the answers), before poor sales (28%).
The widespread use of trade credit implies that trade credit chains have probably harmful consequences at the
macroeconomic level too. Although there is, to my knowledge, no evidence on the link between trade credit
and macroeconomic crises, it is worth noting that the most rapid growth in trade credit took place prior to
the Great Depression. McElvaine (1984) thus reports that "by the end of the 1920’s 60% of cars and 80% of
radios were bought on installment credit" and that "between 1925 and 1929 the total amount of outstanding
installment credit more than doubled" in the US. Trade credit chains probably still have some impact on the
b u s i n e s sc y c l e sn o w a d a y s .
1See Figure 1a.
2In this press article, titled "EDS joins US Airways casualties", it was also mentioned that EDS had Dollars 27 millions in
receivables and work in progress due from US Airways, as well as Dollars 16 millions in other assets. While EDS was one of US
Airways’s smaller creditors, the potential charge came at a sensitive time for the group, which was already struggling with ﬂat
revenue and was to cut 20,000 staﬀ. This announcement came after Snecma, the French aero-engine maker, said its commitments
with US Airways would force it to take a Euros 35 million charge if the airline remained in Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
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January 2006How harmful are chain reactions at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels? Can sound businesses default because
of their trade debtors? If so, do these defaults concern a large proportion of businesses? There has been
no thorough answer to these questions so far, and common wisdoms on this matter are not clear cut. The
purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions.
The novelty of the paper is to develop a theoretical macroeconomic model that describes trade credit chains
and makes it possible to identify the impact of the latter, both at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels. In the model
ﬁrms are identical ex ante, live one period, invest at the beginning of the period, and have random returns
on their investment at the end of the period. Projects are ﬁnanced thanks to trade credit: ﬁrms both borrow
from and (by symmetry) lend to each other at the beginning of the period. At the end of the period, ﬁrms
have two types of assets: the return on investment, and the repayment of their accounts receivable from their
customers. By assuming a continuous distribution of returns, it is possible to identify three groups of ﬁrms
ex post. Firms whose returns are above a certain threshold have enough assets to clear their debts without
even being repaid one cent from their customers; these are "liquid" ﬁrms. By contrast, ﬁrms whose returns
are below another, lower threshold default on their debts even if they are fully repaid by their customers;
these are "unsound" ﬁrms. And there are intermediate ﬁrms, whose returns are in-between the two thresholds.
Although these ﬁrms are sound, they may default if they have bad customers. This third group is of particular
interest because it is the one exposed to ﬁnancial contagion.
Another innovation of the paper is to provide a quantitative insight into the consequences of chain reactions,
both at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels. To do so, I calibrate and simulate the model using recent US annual
data. At the microeconomic level, I ﬁnd that, when customers of a sound ﬁrm are ﬁnancially distressed, then
this ﬁrm gets into ﬁnancial diﬃculties with a probability that ranges from 4.1% to 12.8% (depending on the
underlying economic scenario). Looking at the macroeconomic level, I ﬁnd that defaults on trade debts lower
GDP by at least 0.4%. During the second half of the 90’s, these deadweight losses doubled and reached a high
of 0.9% to 2.3% of GDP (depending on the underlying economic scenario) before the recession of 2001. The
results of the simulations also suggest that ﬁnancial contagion across businesses had been 25% higher during
the last recession than during the recession of the early 90’s.
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss and quantify the impact of the use of trade credit
on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial distress at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels. Trade credit is the single most
important source of external ﬁnance for ﬁrms. It appears on every balance sheet and repre-
sented more than one half of US businesses’ short term liabilities in 2004.3 It is also is a very
peculiar source of ﬁnance. First, ﬁrms simultaneously grant and receive trade credits, which
therefore appear on both sides of their balance sheet. Second, trade credit is in general not
well diversiﬁed at the ﬁrm level, as ﬁrms’ customers tend to belong to a speciﬁcs e c t o r .I ti s
indeed not rare for a company to have one large trade credit vis-a-vis one main client on its
books, which may represent the entire proﬁto ft h ey e a r .
These two features led some authors, like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), to argue that the use
of trade credit causes shocks to propagate in the economy. For instance, if the main client of
a company has no money, then this company might not get paid prior to the end of the year,
meaning that it will have no proﬁtf o rt h ey e a r .I nt h ew o r s tc a s e ,t h ec o m p a n yw i l ld e f a u l t
on its debts as well; in the best case, its credit rating will be downgraded, making it more
expensive to raise external funds and to invest. In Kiyotaki and Moore’s words, "a small,
negative, speciﬁcs h o c kt oo n eﬁrm’s technology or net worth may cause a chain reaction in
which other ﬁrms get into ﬁnancial diﬃculties". The recent crisis in the Airline sector provides
typical examples of such chain reactions. In September 2004, for instance, the "exposure of
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) to US Airways was such that it could slice almost a third
from its third-quarter earnings as it [EDS] joined the list of creditors and suppliers to suﬀer
following the airline’s bankruptcy ﬁling" (Financial Times, 17/09/04).4 Non-payments of
trade credit do not aﬀect only large companies. Collecting the answers from 131 US small
businesses that ﬁled for bankruptcy to a questionnaire about the causes for their failures
in 2002 (see Table 1), Bradley and Rubach (2002) indeed ﬁnd that entrepreneurs consider
3S e eF i g u r e1 a .
4In this press article, titled "EDS joins US Airways casualties", it was also mentioned that EDS had Dollars
27 millions in receivables and work in progress due from US Airways, as well as Dollars 16 millions in other
assets. While EDS was one of US Airways’s smaller creditors, the potential charge came at a sensitive time
for the group, which was already struggling with ﬂat revenue and was to cut 20,000 staﬀ. This announcement
came after Snecma, the French aero-engine maker, said its commitments with US Airways would force it to
take a Euros 35 million charge if the airline remained in Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
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January 2006non-payments of trade credit as the most important cause for their bankruptcy (31% of the
answers), before poor sales (28%).
Table 1: Major Causes for Bankruptcy (in %)
Non-payment of Trade Credit 31
Poor sales 28
Lawsuits 8
No major cause identiﬁed 33
The widespread use of trade credit implies that trade credit chains have probably harmful
consequences at the macroeconomic level too. Although there is, to my knowledge, no ev-
idence on the link between trade credit and macroeconomic crises, it is worth noting that
the most rapid growth in trade credit took place prior to the Great Depression. McElvaine
(1984) thus reports that "by the end of the 1920’s 60% of cars and 80% of radios were bought
on installment credit" and that "between 1925 and 1929 the total amount of outstanding in-
stallment credit more than doubled" in the US. Trade credit chains probably still have some
impact on the business cycles nowadays, as suggested by the fact that both the weight of
trade debts in the economy and the share of bad trade debts in total trade debts increased
steadily (by more than 60% for the latter) over the 6 years preceding the last US recession
(see Figures 1a-b) 5
How harmful are chain reactions at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels? Can sound businesses
default because of their trade debtors? If so, do these defaults concern a large proportion
of businesses? There has been no thorough answer to these questions so far, and common
wisdoms on this matter are not clear cut. On the one hand, business managers typically
5Sources: IMF, Flows of Funds Accounts (FFA) and Compustat. In ﬁgure 1a, I have reported two trade
debt to output ratios. One is the trade debt, as reported in the FFA, divided by GDP. The other is the total
trade debt for the S&P500 companies, as reported in Compustat, divided by total sales for the same ﬁrms.
(This latter ratio is consistent with the bad debt-to-trade debt ratio showed in Figure 1b.) As the maturity
of trade debt is in general lower than a quarter, the end-of-the-year stock of trade debts corresponds to a
quarterly ﬂow. In order to have meaningful trade debt-to-output ratios, I therefore reported in Figure 1a the
trade debt observed at the end of the year divided by the average quarterly output the same year. In Figure 1b,
I reported for each year the average of the "bad trade debts" to "total accounts receivable" ratio for S&P500
companies. In compustat, the item "bad trade debts " corresponds to the receivables estimated doubtful and
represents the provisions for bad debts, i.e. the amount of receivables estimated to be uncollectable. The
GDP Gap is the annual average of the quarterly HP-ﬁltered cycle, in percentage deviation from the trend.
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January 2006answer that customers’ defaults are detrimental to their ﬁnancial health. On the other hand,
however, macroeconomists usually argue that such defaults have only a minor eﬀect on the
macroeconomy because the amount of net trade credit is negligible and, therefore, defaults
should cancel out across ﬁrms at the aggregate level. One major diﬃculty in answering
the above questions in a rigorous manner is to disentangle the various causes for default.
In particular, one needs to distinguish the eﬀect of a chain reaction that causes ﬁnancial
diﬃculties to otherwise sound and healthy ﬁr m sf r o mt h a to fac h a i nr e a c t i o nt h a ta g g r a v a t e s
ﬁnancial distress of intrinsically unsound, faltering ﬁrms. Another diﬃculty is the paucity of
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Figure 1b: Bad trade debt ratio
The novelty of the present paper is to develop a theoretical macroeconomic model that de-
scribes trade credit chains and makes it possible to identify the impact of the latter, both
at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels. In the model ﬁrms are identical ex ante, live one period,
invest at the beginning of the period, and have random returns on their investment at the
end of the period. Projects are ﬁnanced thanks to trade credit: ﬁrms both borrow from and
(by symmetry) lend to each other at the beginning of the period. At the end of the period,
ﬁrms have two types of assets: the return on investment, and the repayment of their ac-
counts receivable from their customers. By assuming a continuous distribution of returns, it
is possible to identify three groups of ﬁrms ex post. Firms whose returns are above a certain
threshold have enough assets to clear their debts without even being repaid one cent from
their customers; these are "liquid" ﬁrms. By contrast, ﬁrms whose returns are below another,
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are "unsound" ﬁrms. And there are intermediate ﬁrms, whose returns are in-between the two
thresholds. Although these ﬁrms are sound, they may default if they have bad customers.
This third group is of particular interest because it is the one exposed to ﬁnancial contagion.
Another innovation of the paper is to provide a quantitative insight into the consequences of
chain reactions, both at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels. To do so, I calibrate and simulate the
model using recent US annual data. At the microeconomic level, I ﬁnd that, when customers
of a sound ﬁrm are ﬁnancially distressed, then this ﬁrm gets into ﬁnancial diﬃculties with a
probability that ranges from 4.1% to 12.8% (depending on the underlying economic scenario).
Looking at the macroeconomic level, I ﬁnd that defaults on trade debts lower GDP by at least
0.4%. During the second half of the 90’s, these deadweight losses doubled and reached a high
of 0.9% to 2.3% of GDP (depending on the underlying economic scenario) before the recession
of 2001. The results of the simulations also suggest that ﬁnancial contagion across businesses
had been 25% higher during the last recession than during the recession of the early 90’s.
The papers closest to mine are Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and Allen & Gale (2000). The
common feature with Kiyotaki and Moore’s paper is the focus on contagion across ﬁrms.
One diﬀerence is that their contagion mechanism occurs on the real side of interﬁrm trade
and relies on the assumption that ﬁrms produce "customized" goods. In a nutshell, ﬁnancial
distress leads ﬁrms to cut back orders to their suppliers,w h oa r et h e nl e f tw i t hu n s o l dg o o d s .
T h ef a c tt h a tg o o d sa r ec u s t o m i z e dm a k e st h e mh a r dt ot r a d ea n dr e c y c l e ,i m p l y i n gt h a t
suppliers get into ﬁnancial diﬃculties as well. The present paper also departs from Allen and
Gale’s paper, as the latter focuses on ﬁnancial contagion across banks and consider a liquidity
preference shock. Finally, none of these two related papers provide quantitative insights into
the size of contagion and its eﬀects on the macroeconomy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I present the basic setup of the model in Section
2, describe ﬁnancial contagion in Section 3. I discuss the results of the model in Section 4,
and present simulations in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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I consider a one period economy with N small risk-neutral entrepreneurs (or ﬁrms) of mass 1
N
(with N large) who are perfectly competitive. Each entrepreneur is endowed with entrepreneur-
speciﬁc labour and has access to a technology that transforms L units of labour during the
period into q units of ﬁnal goods at the end of the period.6 The returns q are random, iden-




where α ∈ (0,1). These returns are publicly and perfectly observable. I will denote by F(q)
the cumulative of f,d e ﬁned over R.A n e g a t i v e v a l u e o f q means that the entrepreneur
incurred an adverse liquidity shock at the end of the period. (This assumption is a simple
and convenient way to have ﬁrms default ex post.) Entrepreneurs supply and demand labour
at the beginning of the period and consume ﬁn a lg o o d sa tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .T h e yd r a w
a utility equal to one at the end of the period from every ﬁnal good they consume, and a
disutility equal to one at the beginning of the period from every unit of labour they supply.
I assume that the unit wage is equal to one (so that the net disutility from supplying labour
is equal to zero) and that entrepreneurs discount future at a factor R.
A prerequisite for trade credit to exist is to have interﬁrm trade exist. With this purpose,
I assume that entrepreneurs cannot use their own speciﬁcl a b o u ri nt h e i ro w np r o j e c t ,a n d
have to hire another entrepreneur (say "supplier") to run it. By symmetry, each entrepreneur
supplies his own speciﬁc labour to another entrepreneur ("customers"). To prevent barters, I
also assume that it is never the case that a supplier needs his customer’s speciﬁc labour (i.e.
there is no "double-coincidence of wants"). Labour is hired at the beginning of the period.
As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), entrepreneurs do not raise ﬁnance from outside investors
and borrow from their suppliers only (see next paragraph). Every entrepreneur/customer
thus purchases labour on credit, i.e. pays the wage L to his supplier at the end of the period.
It follows that every entrepreneur both borrows L (accounts payable) from his supplier and
6What I will refer to as "labour" throughout the paper could also be understood in a broad sense —rather
than literally— as business-to-business services or intermediate goods.
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of the period. This dual nature is a well-known feature of trade credit.
There are many reasons why ﬁrms use trade credit (see Petersen and Rajan (1997) for a
review of the traditional literature). Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), for instance, propose an
explanation based on the idea that for ﬁrms it is easier to divert cash than to divert inputs,
implying that, unlike suppliers, banks may refuse to lend for fear that entrepreneurs run away
with the cash. In the present paper I will justify the use of trade credit by another theory
based on input quality and asymmetric information (see Lee and Stowe (1993)). I assume
that suppliers have the choice to deliver high or low quality labour, and that they draw no
disutility from supplying low quality labour. I also assume that customers have a negative
return on their project when they use low quality labour. Labour quality is observable by
suppliers and customers, but it is not veriﬁable by third parties (e.g. by a Court), notably
because negative returns may also occur with high quality labour. In this environment, it is
easy to see that if entrepreneurs/customers borrow from banks and pay their suppliers cash at
the beginning of the period, then they will be supplied with low quality labour. In contrast,
if they ask for late payment, then they will be supplied with high quality labour. The reason
is that suppliers want their customers’ projects to have positive returns so that customers
are able to pay their trade debt at the end of the period. As a consequence, it is optimal for
entrepreneurs to ﬁnance entirely through trade credit.7
At the beginning of the period, entrepreneurs sign debt contracts with their suppliers and
their customers. These contracts specify the gross interest rate factor on trade credit, denoted
by R, as well as the amount of the trade debt, L. Figure 2 represents the trade credit chain the
N entrepreneurs are involved into. The typical entrepreneur chooses his demand for labour L
and the lending rate R that maximize his expected proﬁt. To solve for the equilibrium I will
proceed in three steps. First, I describe how debt repayments take place at the end of the
period. Second, I derive the equilibrium lending rate. Third, I derive the equilibrium demand
for labour (or trade debt)
7Suppliers would deliver low quality labour even if they were partially paid cash because the net utility
they draw from supplying high quality labour at the unit wage is equal to zero.
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The assumption that projects have random returns implies that debt repayments are uncer-
tain. In particular, ﬁrms with low returns will not be able to honor their debts. As a result,
repayments depend crucially on how well diversiﬁed their credit portfolio is.
Diversiﬁcation. Observationally, trade credit is imperfectly diversiﬁed. (This is another
well known of its features.) As ﬁrms usually belong to a speciﬁc geographical area or sector,
they are likely to be sensitive to the idiosyncratic shocks that hit their customers. To capture
this idea and simplify the exposure of the model, I make temporarily the assumption that every
entrepreneur has only one customer (I will relax this assumption in Section 4.2). Obviously,
ﬁrms do trade with a pool of customers in practice and this assumption is a simple way to
model the imperfect diversiﬁcation of such pool. By symmetry, every ﬁrm also has only one
supplier. In this context, a shock to the liquidity of one ﬁrm may cause a chain reaction along

























Figure 2: The trade credit chain
Given the uncertainty surrounding debt repayments, an entrepreneur, say n − 1,m a yr e p a y
only a fraction x 6 1 of his due payables to his supplier, i.e. entrepreneur n,a tt h ee n do f
the period (see Figure 2). This happens when his total assets are lower than his total debt.
By symmetry, entrepreneur n may be able to repay only a fraction u 6 1 of his due payables,
as shown in the balance sheets below.
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q




xRL− collection cost uRL −→
Table 2: End-of-period Balance Sheets
The total ex post assets of entrepreneur n at the end of the period is equal to its ex post
net return q plus the reimbursement of trade credit from entrepreneur n − 1, xRL,n e t
of the cost of collecting the money (see next paragraph). How large x is depends on the
assets of entrepreneur n − 1, and in particular on his project’s returns. As a result, the
fractions of repayment x and u are also random variables, whose distributions are related
to the distribution of q. I will denote by g the distribution of repayments, and by G the
corresponding cumulative. (Note that distribution of assets at the end of the period is fully
characterized by f and g.)
Collection Cost. It is not rare that trade creditors hire the services of collection agencies
to help them collect their money at the due date of payment. The implied costs are of various
natures. They can be transaction costs: insolvent customers may shuﬄe to repay their debt
and thereby force trade creditors to visit them several times to get some money back. Costs
can also arise from a moral hazard problem (e.g. costly state veriﬁcation): solvent customers
may invoke bad ﬁnancial health in order not to repay their debt, and force suppliers to
monitor, at a cost, all defaulting customers. In the rest of the paper I will assume that the
collection cost associated with a repayment xRL is equal to φ(x)xRL. The function φ is
such that φ(1) = 0, which means that the cost is null when the customer is solvent. I also
assume that φ(x) ∈ [0,1], which means that the repayment always covers the collection cost,
and that φ
0 (x) < 0, which means that the lower the repayment, the higher the fraction of
the repayment devoted to paying the collection cost. To ﬁxi d e a s ,Is e tφ(x)=1− xη with
η > 0,w h e r eη captures the size of the cost. In net terms, suppliers therefore get x1+ηRL
when customers repay a fraction x of their trade debt. While they collect the money at no
cost if η =0 , they do not get anything in net terms as η → +∞.
As Figure 3 shows, collection costs do not increase monotonously with the amount of the
14
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to collect payments either if there is nothing to collect or if the customer is solvent, while it
is costly to collect payments in intermediate cases. Collection costs will play an important
role in the model as they imply that defaults generate deadweight losses, increase the cost
of external ﬁnance, and eventually have a negative impact on labour demand and aggregate
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Figure 3: Collection cost
Repayment Distribution. If entrepreneur n is repaid a fraction x of his accounts receiv-
able by entrepreneur n−1, then his total asset amounts to q+x1+ηRL (see Table 2). Therefore,
he will not be able to repay more than a fraction u of his accounts payable to entrepreneur
n +1if his total assets are lower than a fraction u of his total debt: q + x1+ηRL 6 uRL.
It follows that the probability G(u) that entrepreneur n repays less than a fraction u of his
trade debt writes:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨







g(x)dx ∀u ∈ [0,1)
with g is such that G(u)=
R u
0 g(x)dx ∀u ∈ [0,1] and G(1) = 1
(2.2)
Note that the distribution of entrepreneur n’s repayments depends not only on the distribution
of his own return, but also on the distribution of entrepreneur n − 1’s repayments. As a
consequence, the repayment distribution g(.) is the ﬁxed point solution to equation (2.2). (I
show in Appendix 8 that a solution exists and is unique.) The probability G(u) increases
with the entrepreneur’s total debt. It is also closely related to the distribution of returns f,
to the extent that the riskier the distribution of returns, the less likely are entrepreneurs to
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repay their debts.In the rest of the paper, I will say that a ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress (or, equivalently, that it
is insolvent or defaults on its debt) when its total assets are below its total debt at the end
of the period: q + x1+ηRL < RL. I will also make a distinction between liquid and "sound"
ﬁrms. A ﬁrm will be said liquid when it can repay its whole debt cash on the nail, i.e. without
being repaid by its customer: q > RL. In contrast, I will say that a ﬁrm is sound if it can
repay its debt as soon as it is fully repaid by its customer, i.e. if q > 0. Hence, a sound ﬁrm
may be in ﬁnancial distress if its customer does not repay enough of his due payables.
2.2 Equilibrium Lending Rates
The objective of the typical entrepreneur/supplier is to ﬁx the lending interest rate on trade
credit that maximizes his total expected proﬁt. However, the assumption of perfect competi-
tion implies they break-even in the equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium lending interest rate






g(x)dx = R (2.3)
which means that the average net repayment to suppliers (left hand side) is equal to the
opportunity cost of lending (right hand side). Relation (2.3) implies that the lending rate is
higher than the riskless rate R
∗
>R . On the entrepreneur/customer’s side, the expected cost












− 1 > 0 (2.4)
where the term θ is the external ﬁnance premium imputable to collection costs. Relation (2.4)
implies R 6 (1+θ)R<R
∗
. When collection costs are null, θ =0and entrepreneurs/customers
r e p a yo na v e r a g et h es a f ei n t e r e s tr a t e .I nF i g u re 4 below I have represented the relationship
between the lending rate and the external ﬁnance premium due to collection costs on the one
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January 2006hand, and risk on the other hand. I measured the latter by the variance of the distribution f,
the mean of f staying constant. In this numerical application, I set α =0 .5, A =1 , L =0 .2,
R =1 .02,a n dη =1 0 . Unlike the lending rate, the external ﬁnance premium due to collection
costs does not increase monotonously with risk. The reason is that collection costs do not
increase monotonously with the amount collected: they are low when repayments are either
low or large, that is to say when the variance of returns is high, while they are large when
repayments are intermediate, i.e. when the variance of returns is low (see Figure 3). It follows
that the total deadweight loss due to debt collection ﬁrst increases with risk, as more ﬁrms
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Figure 4: External Finance Premium and Risk
2.3 Equilibrium Labour Demand and Trade Debt
The objective of the typical entrepreneur/customer consists in choosing the quantity of labour
L that maximizes his total expected proﬁt. Labour demand determines the amount of trade
debt contracted by the entrepreneur. Since the average return of the project is equal to
q = ALα and trade debt repayments are on average equal to (1 + θ)RL, the expected proﬁt
of the entrepreneur is equal to ALα − (1 + θ)RL.T h e ﬁrst order condition determines the
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Labour demand depends negatively on the riskless interest rate factor R (since entrepreneurs
pay labour on credit) as well as on the external ﬁnance premium due to collection costs θ
and thus on the number of defaults in the economy. It therefore also depends on the return
and repayment distributions f and g (see relations (2.2) and (2.4)). A shift of the return
distribution to its left (following, for instance, a negative technology shock) entails a shift
of repayment distribution to its left, which raises the cost of external ﬁnance and thereby
magniﬁes the initial eﬀects of the shock.
Aggregate Cost of Defaults. In absence of collection costs, defaults only aﬀect the distri-
bution of wealth across entrepreneurs at the end of the period. As there is then no deadweight
loss in the economy and entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, entrepreneurs do not account for these
distributional eﬀects when they choose the size of their project. As a consequence, defaults do
not aﬀect aggregate output. Things are diﬀerent when debt collection is costly. In this case,
defaults have a negative eﬀect on output because entrepreneurs/suppliers ask for a positive
interest rate premium on trade credit (θ>0) to cover the collection cost they expect to incur
at the end of the period. The higher this premium, the lower the size of the projects. The
eﬀect of defaults on aggregate output can be measured by the gap between the outputs that
would prevail without (θ =0 )a n dw i t h( θ>0) collection costs. Denoting by ρ this gap and
using relations (2.5) and (2.6), one gets ρ =( 1+θ)
α
1−α − 1 > 0.8
3C h a i n R e a c t i o n s
It is now possible to derive the probability to get into ﬁnancial distress, which I denote by P:
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January 2006The reason why an entrepreneur defaults is twofold: either he is unsound, or he is sound but
illiquid and his client did not repay enough of his trade debt. In the ﬁr s tc a s e ,t h ee n t r e p r e n e u r
defaults, irrespective of the quality of his customer. This happens with probability Punsound:
Punsound = F (0) (3.2)
The assumption that entrepreneurs may experience negative liquidity shock (i.e. F (0) >
0) is crucial to have ﬁnancial contagion (see relation (3.4) below), to the extent that the
repayments made to unsound ﬁrms are absorbed by the liquidity shock, which thus prevents
unsound ﬁrms from repaying there own debt. In the second case, a so-called domino eﬀect
(or ﬁnancial contagion) is present in the sense that the entrepreneur defaults because his
customer primarily defaulted on him. This happens with probability Pcontag,w h i c hc a nb e
derived easily by decomposing the unconditional probability of default as follows:
P =( 1− P
∗).Punsound + P.(Punsound + Pcontag)=Punsound + P.Pcontag (3.3)
where Punsound+Pcontag is the probability that an entrepreneur defaults given that his customer
defaulted and P.Pcontag is the probability to be sound and yet insolvent. Hence, Pcontag can
also be viewed as the proportion of sound among insolvent ﬁrms. Relation (3.3) implicitly





Relations (3.1) and (3.2) show that ﬁnancial contagion arises even in absence of collection
costs (P>P unsound even when η =0 ). This illustrates the idea that ﬁnancial contagion is
due to distributional eﬀects in the ﬁrst place. I have represented in Figure 5 the relationship
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Figure 5: Default Probabilities and Risk
Unlike the probabilities to default and to be unsound, the default probability due to the
domino eﬀect does not increase monotonously with risk. It ﬁrst increases and then decreases
as the variance of returns goes up. To understand this point, consider three economies, with
low, intermediate and high risks, in which the expected return and the total debt are both
equal to one (q =1 ), and the interest rates are such that RL =1 /2. In the low risk economy,
all ﬁrms produce q =1with certainty and are therefore liquid. There is no default. In
the intermediate risk economy, returns are distributed according to a Uniform law over the
interval [0,2]. Since there is a continuum of returns, some ﬁrms are illiquid, sound, and not
repaid by their customer. As a result, a domino eﬀect is present. In the high risk economy,
ﬁrms produce either q =0or q =2with probability 1/2, so that they are either unsound
or liquid. Since no ﬁrm relies on its customer to repay its own debt (i.e. no ﬁrm is both
sound and illiquid), there is no domino eﬀect. It follows that the domino eﬀect only exists
in intermediate risk economies where some ﬁrms rely on their receivables to repay their own
debt.
4D i s c u s s i o n
4.1 Contagion and Containment
In the economy, an initial adverse shock to the ﬁnancial wealth of an entrepreneur, say
n, might cause a chain reaction in which entrepreneurs n +1 , n +2 ,... get into ﬁnancial
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of entrepreneurs n +1 , n +2 ,... at the end of the period. If entrepreneur n +1is liquid,
then he is able to repay his whole debt despite the losses he incurs on his receivables. In this
case, the chain reaction is "contained". (See Allen and Gale (2000) for a deﬁnition of the
notion of "containment".) If, by contrast, entrepreneur n +1is not liquid, then the initial
shock to his customer has an impact on his repayment capacity, which aﬀects entrepreneur
n +2 ’s ﬁnancial wealth, etc. In this case, there is a chain reaction: the probability that
entrepreneur n +1defaults owing to the default of entrepreneur n is Pcontag (direct link
in the trade chain), the probability that entrepreneur n +2defaults because entrepreneur n
defaulted is P2
contag (two links ahead in the trade chain), and the probability that entrepreneur
n + j defaults because of n is P
j
contag (j links ahead). Obviously, the ﬁnancial diﬃculties of
entrepreneur n are more contagious for entrepreneur n +1(his direct supplier) than for
entrepreneurs n +2, n +3 ,... and the probability that an entrepreneur "contaminates"
another entrepreneur decreases geometrically with the number of links that separate them
in the trade chain. Eventually, the average number of defaults generated exclusively by the




In the basic model, the assumption that every entrepreneur has only one customer made
his ﬁnancial health particularly dependent of his customer’s and thereby gave strength to
the domino eﬀect. Here I generalize the basic model by assuming that each entrepreneur
trades with a pool of K suppliers and a pool of K customers indexed by k =1 ,...,K,w i t h
1 6 K<N . In this new setup, every entrepreneur holds a fraction 1
K of its customers’
trade credit claims. For example, entrepreneur n holds a fraction 1
K of entrepreneur k’s trade
credit claims and gets 1
Kx
1+η
k RL from entrepreneur k at the end of the period, where xk is
the fraction of trade credit that k repays. I will denote the total repayment to entrepreneur






k .E n t r e p r e n e u rn will not be able to repay more than a
fraction u of its debts if his ex post return q is such that q + xRL 6 uRL.B ya n a l o g yw i t h
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 573











g(x1)...g(xK)dx1...dxK ∀u ∈ [0,1)
as well as the equilibrium lending rate, which is still given by relation (2.3).
In the special case of perfect diversiﬁcation, when K −→ +∞ (and N>K+1−→ +∞),














As entrepreneurs are certain to receive RL from their customers at the end of the period,










. Note that perfect diversiﬁcation does not eliminate ﬁnancial conta-
gion (P>F (0))b e c a u s ei td o e sn o te n a b l ee n t r e p r e n e u r st oc l o s et h eg a pb e t w e e nw h a tt h e y
get from their customers (RL)a n dw h a tt h e yo w e( RL).
5Q u a n t i ﬁcation of the Domino Eﬀect
In this section I simulate the model in order to evaluate the domino eﬀe c ta n d ,m o r eg e n e r a l l y ,
the consequences of defaults at the ﬁrm and aggregate levels. To do so, I calibrate the model
using annual data from US National Accounts and Compustat (see footnote 5). Assuming
that returns are distributed Normally, I have to calibrate the parameters A, α, R, K, η,
and the standard deviation σ of the return distribution. I take the economy with perfect
diversiﬁcation (K =+ ∞) and without collection cost (η =0 ) as a benchmark, and set the
technology parameters A =1 .44, α =0 .4,a n dσ =0 .6 in order to have, in this benchmark
economy, aggregate output normalized to one (q =1 ), the trade debt to output ratio equal
to L/q =3 9 .8%, which corresponds to the ratio observed in 2004 (see Figure 1a), and the
probability of default equal to P =4 .7%, which corresponds to the bad trade debt to total
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January 2006trade debt ratio observed in 2004 (see Figure 1b).9 I also set R =0 .988, which is equal to one
plus the real interbank loan rate in 2004. The results of the simulations for various degrees of
diversiﬁcation (K =1 , 2, +∞) and collection costs (η =0 , 2, +∞) are reported in Table 3.
When the customers of a sound ﬁrm are ﬁnancially distressed, then this ﬁrm gets into ﬁnancial
diﬃculties with a strictly positive probability. This probability ranges from 3.4% to 11.3%,
depending on the level of collection costs and the degree of diversiﬁcation. Although the
existence of collection costs is not a condition for ﬁnancial contagion to arise, the latter is
more than 2 times larger when collection costs are high (η =+ ∞) than when they are null
(η =0 ).
(in %) L/qPP unsound Pcontag R − Rθ ρ
Observed 39.8 4.7 - - - - -
Benchmark: η =0
K =+ ∞ 39.8 4.7 4.5 3.4 2.4 0 0
K =2 39.8 4.7 4.5 4.1 2.4 0 0
K =1 39.8 4.8 4.5 5 2.5 0 0
"Best case" scenarios: η =2
K =+ ∞ 39.4 4.9 4.6 4.8 3.6 1.0 0.7
K =2 39.4 4.9 4.6 6.1 3.6 1.0 0.7
K =1 39.4 5.0 4.6 7.5 3.7 1.0 0.7
"Worst case" scenarios: η =+ ∞
K =+ ∞ 38.8 5.2 4.8 6.9 5.3 2.6 1.7
K =2 38.8 5.3 4.8 8.9 5.5 2.6 1.7
K =1 38.8 5.4 4.8 11.3 5.6 2.7 1.7
Table 3: Numerical application
The magnitude of ﬁnancial contagion also depends on how well diversiﬁed entrepreneurs are
(see discussion in Section 4.2). I thus ﬁnd that perfect diversiﬁcation reduces on average
9Note that the normalization of the scale of output does not aﬀect the results of the simulations to the
extent that I ﬁx the trade debt to output ratio and the probability of default.
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level, non-repayments have an eﬀect on GDP (ρ>0) only if one assumes strictly positive
collection costs, i.e. if η>0. Factoring companies usually advertise fees for managing and
collecting receivables from 1% to 3%. In the model, the premium due to collection costs θ is
compatible with these ﬁgures if η>2. Beside the benchmark η =0 , I therefore reported the
results of the simulations in two additional scenarios. In the "best case scenario" (η =2 ), I
ﬁnd that GDP losses due to the defaults on trade debt (ρ)a m o u n tt o0.7% of GDP, while in
t h e" w o r s tc a s es c e n a r i o "( η =+ ∞), I ﬁnd 1.7%. Unlike collection costs, diversiﬁcation has
little eﬀect on aggregate output, for the reason that it mostly aﬀects the distribution of wealth
across entrepreneurs but not wealth itself. The model also predicts the interest rate spread
on trade debt ranges from 3.6% to 5.6%, which is above the observed 2.1% spread on short
term bank loans to businesses in 200410, which is therefore consistent with the widespread
view that trade credits are more expensive than bank loans.
Financial Contagion in the Business Cycle. The aim of this paragraph is to evaluate
ﬁnancial contagion (Pcontag) and the aggregate cost of defaults (ρ) over the last US business
cycle. To obtain a range of plausible values for Pcontag and ρ, I simulate the model in the worst
and best case scenarios described above, with K =1and K =+ ∞ respectively. To have
meaningful results, I re-calibrate the model so that it faithfully replicates the average trade
debt to sales (L/q) and bad debt to trade debt (P) ratios observed for the S&P500 companies,
as well as the US GDP cycle (q). I normalize the GDP trend to one, and deﬁne the GDP cycle
as equal to one plus the observed GDP gap (q =1 +GDP gap11). As riskless interest rate, I
use the observed real interbank loan rate. Given the observations of the endogenous variables
qt, Lt/qt, Pt and the interest rate factor Rt in year t, I invert the model by solving the three
equations (2.1), (2.6), and (3.1) for the three parameters At, σt, αt.12 I do this calibration
exercise for each year over the period 1986-2004 and each scenario. The parameters thus
10This spread is the diﬀerence between the prime rate on bank loans to businesses and the interbank loan
rate. The prime rate is one of several base rates used by banks to price short-term Business loans (Source:
Federal Reserve Bank).
11As for Figures 1a-b, I deﬁne the GDP Gap as the annual average of the quarterly HP-ﬁltered cycle, in
percentage deviation from the trend.
12T os o l v et h i ss y s t e mo fe q u a t i o n so n en e e d st os o l v es imulataneously for the repayment distribution g
(equation (2.2)), the lending rate (equation (2.3)), and θ (equation (2.4)).
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January 2006calibrated are reported in Figures 6a-c below. The comparison with Figures 1a-b shows that
the scale parameter At, the dispersion parameter σt, and the elasticity αt respectively help
the model replicate the observed level of output, trade debt to output ratio, and probability of
default. In particular, one has to assume an increase in the variance of the return distribution
in the second half of the 90’s in order the model to reproduce the observed rise in the bad
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Fig. 6c: Parameter αt
The results of the simulations are reported in Figures 7a-d. I ﬁnd that the rises in the
probability of default on trade debt and the amount of trade debt in the economy observed
between 1995 and 2000 (Figure 1a-b) worked to increase collection costs. In terms of GDP,
the implied deadweight losses went up to 2.2% of GDP in 2000 in the worst case scenario
(against 0.9% in the best case scenario), before decreasing in 2001. Overall, these GDP losses
were above 0.4% of GDP over the whole period. At the ﬁrm level, the default probability due
to ﬁnancial contagion rose from 8.4% in 1992 in the worst case scenario (against 4.1% in the
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Fig. 7b: Financial Contagion (Pcontag,i n% )
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January 2006The implied interest rate spread on trade debt (R − R), followed the same pattern as the
probability of default, with a surge in 2000-2001 and a drop in 2003-2004. It stayed above
the observed interest rate spread on bank loans and was positively correlated with the latter,
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Fig. 7d: Ext. ﬁnance premia (θ,i n% )
The interest rate spread on trade debt is driven by two forces. The ﬁrst force is the change in
the distribution of returns. For instance, Figures 6a-b show that expected returns increased
in the late 90’s but that, at the same time, the variance of these returns increased as well. As
a result, risks increased and lenders charged a higher risk-premium. The second force is the
change in the external ﬁnance premium due to collection costs (θ). At the end of the 90’s,
ﬁrms increased their lending rates not only because the risk of not being paid back rose, but
also because they expected higher collection costs due to non- repayments (Figure 7d).
The results of the simulations also suggest that ﬁnancial contagion among businesses had
been about 25% higher during the last recession than in the early 90’s. The reason is that
the economy was overall riskier at the end of the 90’s (Figure 6b) while, at the same time,
ﬁr m sw e r em o r es u b j e c tt oﬁnancial contagion, as the weight of trade debt in the economy
w a sm o r et h a t20% higher at the end of the 90’s than in the 80’s (Figure 1a).
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper is the ﬁrst to model ﬁnancial contagion across ﬁrms through chains of trade credit.
I show how, in presence of idiosyncratic shocks, some ﬁr m sm a yn o tb ea b l et or e p a yt h e i r
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January 2006trade payables and thereby have a negative wealth eﬀect on their suppliers. The model makes
it possible to identify liquid, sound, and insolvent ﬁrms. When ﬁrms use trade credit, even
sound ﬁrms may turn out to be insolvent, for the reason that they are not paid back by
their customers. I calibrate the model on US data and simulate it in order to quantitatively
assess the impact of trade credit chains on the economy. Consistent with the conventional
wisdom that defaults on trade credit are a major cause for ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial distress, I ﬁnd that
the proportion of sound ﬁrms among insolvent ﬁrms goes from 4.1% up to 12.8%,d e p e n d i n g
on the business cycle and the economic scenario (high or low diversiﬁcation, high or low
collection costs). At the macroeconomic level, the results of the simulations contrast with
macroeconomists’ common view that ﬁnancial contagion across ﬁrms and defaults on trade
debts are innocuous. Under a reasonable calibration of the model, I indeed ﬁnd that defaults
on trade debts lower aggregate GDP by at least 0.4%. These deadweight losses doubled during
the second half of the 90’s and reached a high of 0.9% to 2.3% of GDP (depending on the
underlying economic scenario) before the recession of 2001. The results of the simulations
also suggest that ﬁnancial contagion across businesses had been 25% higher during the last
recession than during the recession of the early 90’s.
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8 Appendix: A unique repayment distribution g exists
I will give here the sketch of the proof that a unique density function g is solution to equation (2.2) in
t h es i m p l ec a s ew h e r eη =0(the generalization toη>0 is straightforward). Consider the continuous
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January 2006function Γ derivable almost everywhere over interval [0,1] a n ds u c ht h a tΓ(x)=G(x) ∀x ∈ [0,1)
and Γ(1) = lim
x%1















where γ(.) satisﬁes Γ(u)=
R u
0 γ(x)dx ∀u ∈ [0,1] and γ(x)=g(x) ∀x ∈ (0,1).T a k i n gt h eﬁrst























ϕ(u − x)γ(x)dx +( 1− Γ(1)).ϕ(u − 1) + Γ(0).ϕ(u)
¸
(8.3)
where the ﬁrst term into brackets is the convolution product of ϕ and γ. Taking the Fourier
transformations b ϕ and b γ of ϕ and γ, and using the property that the Fourier transformation of the
convolution product of two functions is equal to the ordinary product of the Fourier transformations
of these functions, I get:
b γ(v)=RL.
£




[(1 − Γ(1))e−iv + Γ(0)]
1
RLe ϕ(v) − 1
almost everywhere
Using the inversion theorem of Fourier functions, I know that the density function γ(u) exists and









Since b ϕ(v) is continuous, bounded, and lim|v|→∞ b ϕ(v)=0 , the function under the integral sign
on the right-hand side of the inequality in (8.4) is also continuous, bounded, and tends to zero
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as |v| →∞ . Hence, the integral on the left-hand side of the inequality exists, as well as γ(u).
Therefore, Γ(.) exists.European Central Bank Working Paper Series
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